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Abstract
This article considers the politics of social solidarity from a cross-national perspective. In the
analysis, we rely on four waves of international social survey data for our sample of Western
nations, representative of different welfare state traditions. The time span is a 20-year period
and the total country-wave sample comprises over 40 ,000 records. While there is popular support
for governmental actions to protect citizens in old-age and sickness, views about the social rights of
unemployed citizens are shifting. High-proﬁle activating labour-market reforms are reapportioning
the burden of risk in society. With the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the USA, this
article examines how interests change as citizens lose their stake in the means of security – revealing
an ever more fragile and fractured social solidarity.
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Introduction
In light of recent welfare state reforms, and the pro-employment focus of active
labour market policies (ALMPs) and programmes that help increase the
employment opportunities for jobseekers (European Commission 2016), this
article re-examines and connects welfare, stratiﬁcation and political economy.
Theories about class mobilization have been inﬂuential for thinking about
welfare state development over the long-term. ‘Power resources theory’
(PRT), for example, associated with the work of Walter Korpi and Gøsta
Esping-Andersen, served to illustrate how welfare states had developed (with
varying degrees of success) from class interests (Baldwin1990 ). With the onset
of welfare retrenchment and cost control, however, PRT was challenged by
the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ theory (Bonoli and Natali 2012 provide
a review). This not only implied that class and partisan politics matter less in
the face of short-term self-interest, but also that there is little further
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potential for social democracy to cater for working-class families in a growing
context of ‘permanent austerity’. At the same time, it is claimed that
‘individualizing’ processes are eroding important aspects of solidarity in ‘risk
society’ (as theorized by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, referring to the
manner in which modern society organizes in response to risk, see Beck
2007). Confronting these trends, Western welfare states are being reformed
as they move from their traditional protection roles with the implementation
of new ‘active’ (social investment-orientated) forms of social policy
(Bonoli 2013; Hemerijck 2017). Empirical research, however, has yet to
examine how the new policy agenda is reshaping solidarities inWestern nations
with very different welfare and solidaristic policy traditions (cf. Stjernø 2009 ).
The analysis presented here is supported by four waves of data on
comparative welfare state attitudes taken from the International Social Survey
Programme’s (ISSP) Role of Government (RoG) module. Using regression
techniques, we consider preferences for risk protection across time, place and
the public. We are particularly interested in cross-national attitudes and
class-risk related variations and welfare effects in the data. Empirically, ‘class’
membership can be identiﬁed in surveys by questions related to occupation
(deﬁned here by the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero [EGP] class scheme,
Leiulfsrud et al. 2010). The analysis follows multiple regression procedures
for small-N comparisons (see Esping-Andersen 2007), relying on all four waves
of the RoG module for our sample of eight Western nations (representing each
of the welfare traditions in Esping-Andersen’s inﬂuential typology, see
Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). The time span is a 20-year period and
the total country-wave sample comprises over 40,000 records. Before
describing the study methods and results and discussing their implications, we
consider the scholarship that discusses social attitudes and the welfare state.
Public Attitudes and Social Reform
Attitudes to social policy interventions are extensively discussed in the
research literature. We know that individual socio-demographic
characteristics can inﬂuence the type and strength of support for social policy
interventions. In the attitudinal data, social divisions and cleavages are often
visible in relation to age (or life stage), gender, social class position and
political orientation (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003 ). Respondents may
hold particular views and perceptions of relative ‘deservingness’ (Van
Oorschot 2006; Jæger 2007), and aspects of ‘self-interest’ may also be
apparent (Svallfors 2012 ). Elderly pensioners are often seen as being more
‘needy’ or ‘deserving’ than unemployed workers, for instance. Working-class
voters tend to be more supportive of welfare state policies overall than their
middle-class counterparts (Svallfors 1997 ). Nevertheless, class divisions are
sometimes visible by social programme (Svallfors 2012 ). Attitudes towards
labour market policies, for example, tend to exhibit a class proﬁle, while the
class proﬁle of attitudes towards statutory interventions for health care and
pensions are usually less pronounced.
Research often reveals signiﬁcant cross-national variation in welfare state
attitudes. However, the ‘institutional logic’ of welfare attitudes continues to
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be debated. Not all studies claim to ﬁnd the (expected) regime patterns (Larsen
2008 provides a review). Welfare states may foster and promote solidarity
and they may also reﬂect it, or the lack of it (Stjernø 2009 ). The ‘policy
feedback’ literature suggests that existing welfare institutions condition social
policy preferences (Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014). If welfare states
have a tendency to produce and reproduce their own legitimacy, as Kumlin
and Stadelmann-Steffen observe, then we might expect strong welfare regime
effects from a comparative policy perspective, to reﬂect – at least in part –
dominant welfare state ideology. As our point of departure, we might assume
regime-related variation in the international survey data, as Jæger (2011)
observes. However, in general, citizens in the Nordic countries may not be
more favourable towards the welfare state or particular governmental
programmes than citizens elsewhere. Besides, scholars now argue that once
distinctive welfare regimes might have lost some of their distinctiveness under
successive waves of ALMP reform (Lødemel and Gubrium 2014 ).1 Research
is therefore needed to shed fresh light on the social politics of ALMP reform.
The RoG survey has many advantages for studying changing public opinion
over the long-term since the data collection points track the welfare reform
period across the advanced nations. According to Lødemel and Gubrium,
the ﬁrst international wave of ALMP reform occurred in the early-1990s, a
second wave then followed in1998–2008.
Interests can and do change, as social policy is fashioned and reformed out
of political struggle (Baldwin 1990 ; Svallfors 2012 ). As the mature welfare
states are transformed by ALMP policy, we need to know whether or the
extent to which seemingly solidaristic forms of social policy are breaking
down. On the one hand, we might expect class cleavages to diminish. The
working-class vote appears to be in decline (Gingrich and Häusermann
2015 ) and notions of ‘class struggle’ (as opposition between ‘capital’ and
‘labour’) are said to be less apparent in political life today (Finseraas and
Vernby 2011 ). New solidarities may weaken or cut across traditional class
boundaries in response to ‘risk society’ and ‘individualization’ (Beck and
Grande 2010 provide a review). In post-industrial society, ‘new social risks’
(cf. Bonoli 2013 : 15–17 ) may weaken traditional class-based forms of
solidarity (Esping-Andersen 1993 ; Armingeon 2006 ; Kananen et al.
2006 ; Taylor-Gooby 2011a). Increasingly, working-class groups may be
less likely to offer support for expansive social provision and unemployment
protection in particular (see recent trend analysis with data from the
European Social Survey by Taylor-Gooby [2011b] and the British Social
Attitudes survey by Deeming [2015]). On the other hand, however, we
might expect class awareness and solidarity to increase, as Curran (2013 )
argues. Labour market ﬂexibility and non-standard employment have meant
increased insecurity and risk for low-skilled workers (Chaloff 2008 ; Pintelon
et al. 2013 ). In these circumstances, manual workers may be more inclined
than workers in non-manual occupations to support welfare rights that
safeguard their own self-interest (particularly the ‘right to work’ and social
security protection) – while middle-class and self-reliant groups may become
untrustworthy of those at the bottom of society and this may be reﬂected in
the survey data (Larsen 2013 ).
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In the analysis, we want to know if class interests and welfare state
solidarities are changing and, if so, in which ways? Are attitudes towards
‘need’ and ‘deservingness’ changing or are they stable across time? Are class
preferences for ‘decommodiﬁcation’ and less stratifying policies changing or
are they stable over time? If class interests are changing and solidarities are
under pressure, then what are the potential implications for welfare state
futures?
Method and Data
The comparative analysis of social attitudes for our sample of eight Western
nations relies on survey data from all four rounds of the RoG covering a
20-year reform period (ISSP Research Group 2008). The Nordic-style
welfare states are represented here by Sweden and Norway, and the
Bismarckian or corporatist welfare states by France and Germany. Then there
are the market liberal economies and welfare states, represented by the USA,
the UK, Australia and New Zealand. The total country-wave sample
comprises over 43,000 respondents. Not all countries are present in the ﬁrst
and second waves, but they are in the third and fourth (see the Appendix and
table A1). The RoG module has a number of advantages, some already
alluded to. The data on welfare attitudes are of high quality and derive from
national stratiﬁed random sample surveys based on citizenship conducted in
each participating country (i.e. the data do not normally include residents
who are not citizens). The questionnaire is repeated at regular intervals to
allow cross-national comparisons across survey waves and time points that
span the reform period of interest (i.e. waves I-1985 , II-1990, III-1996 and
IV-2006). Although information on individual identify is limited in mass
social surveys of this kind (and the RoG does not capture reliable information
on race and ethnicity), it does, however, provide occupational codes that are
entirely consistent across nations and recent survey waves. In order to conduct
the analysis, we assume that society is divided into different classes and that
these classes have different political interests and may act as a class in terms
of their interests in risk and social policy. Some people belong to ‘working-
class’ occupations, while others are in ‘middle-class’ occupations. Empirically
at least, class membership can be identiﬁed in surveys by questions related to
occupation. We explore whether different class interests are still evident by
analyzing survey data and we adopt the standard EGP class scheme that is
widely used in comparative research (Leiulfsrud et al. 2010).2
The RoG module asks respondents a series of questions relating to social
citizenship rights as theorized by T. H. Marshall, and welfare preferences
for risk protection across different (traditional) welfare state functions and
social groups. For example, respondents were asked whether it should or
should not be the government’s responsibility to do the following:
• provide health care in the case of serious illness;
• provide a decent standard of living in old-age;
• provide a decent standard of living for unemployed people; and/or
• provide a job for everyone.
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The respondents’ opinions on these four questions are the object of our
analysis. The response categories are ‘deﬁnitely should be’, ‘probably should
be’, ‘probably should not be’, ‘deﬁnitely should not be’ and ‘can’t choose’.
Here we are interested in cross-national trends within policy domains.
Answers that government should ensure that these welfare functions are met
correspond to a more traditional approach to social policy and funding, the
right to health care, the right to a job, etc., in which the role of government
is to minimize social risks in an attempt to meet needs. Following Blekesaune
and Quadagno (2003), survey responses and attitudes towards the role of
government and welfare rights were binary coded into positive (deﬁnitely
should, probably should) and negative (deﬁnitely should not, probably should
not). Logistic regression models for binary outcomes assess the socio-
demographic characteristics that help to explain or predict pro-welfare state
attitudes. Our key independent variables are age, gender, country and class,
and class-related factors, such as unemployment, education, partisanship,
and welfare state regime. The explanatory or predictor variables are ‘dummy
coded’, e.g. ‘unemployed’ dummy variable, ‘professional’ dummy variable,
‘right voter’, etc. The odds ratios in tables 1–3 show the strength and the
direction of the predictors and the reference category or ‘base case’ is always
1 .00. Statistically signiﬁcant differences at the 0 .05 level or better are shown
in bold. All study calculations are weighted to correct for differential and non-
response bias in the survey data.
Responsibility and Rights
In the survey data, there is near universal support for the right to a
decent standard of living in old-age (ﬁgure 1 ) and health care for sick
people (ﬁgure 2 ). Attitudes towards ‘need’ or ‘deservingness’ appear stable
across time. In the USA, for example, where public support is at its lowest
in the sample, we still ﬁnd that the overwhelming majority of Americans
claim that these social programmes are functions of good government.
The latest survey wave, for 2006 , shows that 90 per cent of Americans
believe in the right to a decent standard of living in old-age (ﬁgure 1 ).
Similarly, 90 per cent of Americans (ﬁgure 2 ) appear to agree with
Barack Obama that ‘healthcare should be a right for every American’.3
The 2010 Affordable Care Act brought that right a step closer, although
the political dynamics it engenders continue to challenge. Many
Americans equate health care reform with higher taxes, and the
Republicans are now looking to capitalize on this to repeal Obamacare.
The point, however, is that just 10 per cent of the public in one of the
most economically liberal market societies are sceptical about the state’s
role in this key area of welfare provision (see Jacobs and King 2012 on
interest group politics and US health care reform).
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant cross-national variation in attitudes towards
unemployment protection. Nearly one-half of all Americans in all four waves
of the RoG module do not believe it is the government’s responsibility to
provide decent living standards for unemployed people (ﬁgure 3 ). A similar
picture emerges in Australia. However, in the UK and New Zealand, solidarity
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with unemployed workers has declined during the past two decades. One-half
of the public surveyed in 2006 are now sceptical of this governmental role.
Much has been written about Australasian and American ‘exceptionalism’ in
welfare policy. Most of this literature focuses on the individualistic nature of
liberal society inﬂuencing welfare state architecture. In the USA, ‘workfare’
policies that undermine collective solidarity have a long history (pioneered in
the 1970s), where public support for the principles of collective security is
Table 1
Support for welfare rights (logistic regression)
Government responsibility (comparator: not state responsibility)
Aged
(i)
Sick
(ii)
Unemployed
(iii)
Jobs
(iv)
Age (comparator: 15–24)
25–44 1.04 0.88 1.00 1 .04
45–54 1.10 0.68 1.24 1 .10
55–64 1.22 0.68 1.45 1 .22
65–74 1.47 0.58 1.75 1 .47
75+ 0.81 0.55 1.55 0 .81
Gender (comparator: Male)
Female 1.47 1.26 1.25 1.47
Education (comparator: Degree)
Below degree 1.44 1.26 0.86 1.44
No formal qualiﬁcation 1.95 1.28 0.80 1.95
Labour force status (comparator: Employed)
Unemployed 0.85 1.42 2.28 0 .85
Economically inactive 0.95 1.47 1.17 0 .95
Social class (comparator: Professional)
Salaried white-collar worker 1.12 1.04 1.05 1 .12
Skilled manual worker 1.43 1.80 1.21 1.43
Low-skilled manual worker 1.71 1.86 1.34 1.71
Political Party Allegiance (comparator: Centre-right, conservative)
Centre, liberal 1.49 2.00 1.57 1.49
Centre-left 2.61 4.01 2.62 2.61
Wave/Year (comparator: III-1996)
IV-2006 1.12 1.66 0.71 1.21
Country (comparator: USA)
AUS 2.30 5.43 1.51 2.30
GBR 5.07 16.18 1.32 5.07
NZL 2.68 7.27 1.40 2.68
DEU 1.85 1.76 3.31 1.85
FRA 2.25 4.59 3.27 2.25
NOR 17.08 33.43 11.02 17.08
SWE 3.04 1.77 5.37 3.04
Nagelkerke R-Square 0.15 0.17 0.20 0 .22
Notes: Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold.
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found to be at its lowest in the study sample (Bertram 2016). In Britain,
‘welfare to work’ (as it become known) arrived later, in the 1980s and 1990s
(with learning from the US experience, King and Wickham-Jones 1999 ). In
ofﬁce, the New Labour government under Tony Blair (1997–2007) pursued
stricter work-conditionality policies in an effort to cut unemployment and
spending on social programmes; as did the Labour-led government in New
Zealand under the premiership of Helen Clark (1999–2008).
Table 2
Odds of reporting unemployed people have the right to a decent standard of living
Gender Class USA AUS NZL GBR FRA DEU SWE NOR
Male Professional 0 .51 1.32 1 .20 0.90 2.50 2.70 5.13 10.01
Female Professional 0 .71 1.81 1 .65 1.24 3.44 3.71 7.06 13.78
Male Salaried white-collar 0 .63 1.62 1 .48 1.11 3.08 3.33 6.34 12.36
Female Salaried white-collar 0 .87 2.24 2 .03 1.53 4.25 4.58 8.72 17.01
Male Skilled manual worker 0 .73 1.87 1 .70 1.28 3.54 3.82 7.28 14.20
Female Skilled manual worker 1 .00 2.57 2 .34 1.76 4.88 5.26 10.02 19.55
Male Low-skilled manual worker 0 .79 2.03 1 .84 1.39 3.85 4.16 7.91 15.43
Female Low-skilled manual worker 1 .09 2.79 2 .54 1.91 5.30 5.72 10.89 21.24
Notes: Reference category is a professional American male aged 15–24 .
Table 3
Changing solidities and class interests in welfare rights (logistic regression)
Government responsibility (comparator: not state responsibility)
Aged
(i)
Sick
(ii)
Unemployed
(iii)
Jobs
(iv)
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006
Liberal group (comparator: Professional)
Salaried white-collar worker 1.30 1 .35 0.98 1 .09 1 .30 1 .00 1.31 1.30
Skilled manual worker 1.32 0 .96 1.70 1 .17 1.35 1 .08 1.68 1.46
Low-skilled manual worker 1.42 1 .66 2.05 1 .03 1.50 1.32 2.08 1.86
Nordic group (comparator: Professional)
Salaried white-collar worker 0.99 0 .59 1.13 0 .72 1 .63 1 .16 0.70 1.50
Skilled manual worker 0.71 2 .00 0.70 1 .32 1 .44 1 .18 0.71 1.51
Low-skilled manual worker 0.86 1 .22 0.60 2 .06 1 .33 1 .22 0.76 2.64
Bismarckian group (comparator: Professional)
Salaried white-collar worker 1.02 0 .93 1.13 1 .60 0 .86 0 .78 1.21 1.24
Skilled manual worker 0.78 1 .75 1.14 3.23 1 .04 1 .04 1.16 1.23
Low-skilled manual worker 1.53 1 .81 2.36 2.85 1 .09 0 .83 1.83 2.39
Notes: Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold.
SOCIAL POLICY & ADMINISTRATION, VOL. ••, NO. ••, •• 2017
© 2017 The Authors Social Policy & Administration Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd 7
Universalistic solidarity for the working population emerges most strongly
in the coordinated market economies of Continental and Northern Europe.
In Nordic countries, for example, less than one-ﬁfth of the public responding
to the latest survey object to governmental action to protect the living
Figure 1
‘Decent living standard for the old’: Percentage claiming it should be the government’s
responsibility, by country and wave
Source: ISSP RoG I–IV (ISSP Research Group 2008).
Figure 2
‘Health care for the sick’: Percentage claiming it should be the government’s responsibility, by
country and wave
Source: ISSP RoG I–IV (ISSP Research Group 2008).
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standards of unemployed workers: only 10 per cent did so in Norway
(ﬁgure 3 ). In the Bismarckian social insurance welfare systems, we ﬁnd less
solidarity for workers compared to the Nordics (an effect of the contributory
and solidarity model, Stjernø 2009). However, no more than one-third of
citizens in France and Germany reject governmental action to help protect
workers. By contrast, in the liberal market economies, there is currently little
or no public consensus on the role of government in relation to
unemployment protection (ﬁgure 3). In the last round, the surveyed public
remains divided. One-half support the merits of collective provision for
income maintenance to safeguard and protect citizens against unemployment
risk, while the other half now favours self-insurance or some other form of
individual adaptation to labour market ﬂexibility and risk.
In the English-speaking nations as a whole, we ﬁnd the public is increasingly
sceptical about responsibilities of the state to ensure everyone has a job. Most
people do not believe it is the state’s duty to ensure that everyone has a job
(ﬁgure 4). In the USA, negative attitudes have been fairly constant over all four
survey waves; in the prototypical liberal regime such ﬁndings may not surprise
(given the dominant laissez-faire ideology and weak human capital
enhancement programmes for low-skilled workers, OECD 2013).4 The
strongest levels of support for the right to work are found in the coordinated
market economies of Northern Europe, where full employment and ALMPs
have been favoured from as early as the 1950s (ﬁgure 4). The universalistic
Nordic model of welfare entirely depended on employment maximization,
and the state therefore played a key role in securing this goal. About four-ﬁfths
of the population in Norway and three-ﬁfths of people in Sweden agree with
state-led job-creation to ensure employment for all. Not far behind them come
Figure 3
‘Decent living standard for the unemployed’: Percentage claiming it should be the government’s
responsibility, by country and wave
Source: ISSP RoG I–IV (ISSP Research Group 2008 ).
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the corporatist economies of France and Germany, both of which have strong
ALMP traditions (Bonoli 2010 ). Here most citizens claim that the government
should provide a job for everyone. The survey shows citizens in the liberal
nations are increasingly sceptical about this form of governmental intervention
in the market, however (ﬁgure 4).
In summary, we ﬁnd remarkable agreement cross-nationally on the
functions of state in market economies to ensure decent living standards in
old-age and health care for sick people. There is near universal support in
the sample of nations and the trend is stable across time. At the same time,
we ﬁnd public support for governmental actions to protect workers from
unemployment risks is ﬁrmly divided in the liberal welfare states, thus
revealing substantial cross-national variation. In the next section, we attempt
to explain some of this variation and heterogeneity in attitudes, including, of
course, class-welfare formations and linkages.
The Determinants of Public Attitudes towards Welfare State
Programmes
In the analysis, people in the liberal market economies are least favourably
disposed towards welfare rights and governmental action to help workers.
However, even within these nations, some sections of society may be more
critical of state intervention than others. Here we want to identify more clearly
those groups, which either are in favour of or stand against collective forms of
social policy and citizenship rights.
In the results (table 1), we observe the importance of class, education and
political allegiance in shaping social attitudes. Also important here are national
Figure 4
‘Jobs for everyone’: Percentage claiming it should be the government’s responsibility, by country
and wave
Source: ISSP RoG I–IV (ISSP Research Group 2008).
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contexts and time or survey-wave. Over the survey period, support for social
policy appears to have increased signiﬁcantly in the study sample, with the
exception of social security policy to guard against unemployment risks. The
number of people saying the state should provide a decent standard of living
for unemployed workers has fallen signiﬁcantly (column iii). There are strong
gender and age gradients in the survey data; some are well known in this literature
(Jæger 2007). Women are signiﬁcantly more likely to support governmental
action than men across all social programmes (columns i–iv). The results suggest
there are generational trends in the data. Age gradients suggest that older adults
are more inclined to support governmental action that ensures unemployed
workers have a decent standard of living than younger adults (column iii).
Class is an important contributory factor in the models: working-class
groups display much stronger preferences for unconditional social policy to
guard against social risks, compared to middle-class citizens (table 1 , columns
i–iv). Working-class representatives are signiﬁcantly more likely to say that the
state should provide a decent living standard for aged pensioners and health
care in the case of serious illness, compared to white-collar professionals
(columns i and ii). Representatives of working-class groups are also signiﬁcantly
more likely than middle-class professionals to say that the state should provide a
decent standard of living for unemployed workers and intervene in themarket in
order to guarantee the right to work (columns iii and iv). Table1 shows that pro-
welfare state preferences are consistently strongest amongst low-skilled manual
workers (columns i–iv). Manual workers, who face a different and altogether
higher risk of unemployment, are signiﬁcantly more likely to favour government
intervention to support unemployed people. Other things being equal, the odds
of a manual worker saying that the state should provide a decent standard of
living for unemployed workers are 34 per cent higher than for a citizen in the
professional class (column iii). Low-skilled workers, compared to professionals,
also have nearly twice the odds of claiming that the state should ensure the right
to work (71 per cent higher, as seen in column iv).
In the data, we ﬁnd some support for regime theories, but the picture overall
is less convincing. The highest levels of public support for governmental action
(and social policy) are to be found in the more egalitarian countries,
particularly Norway and to a lesser extent Sweden. At the extremes, for
example, the odds of a Norwegian citizen claiming that the state should
provide decent living standards in retirement are more than17 times greater,
compared to a US citizen (column i). In other words, the odds of a Norwegian
favouring governmental intervention are 1,600 per cent greater than for the
average American, after controlling for everything else. The equivalent odds
of a Norwegian citizen saying that the state has a duty to provide health care
for sick people are 33 times greater compared to a typical US citizen (column
ii); the equivalent odds are 11-1 in favour of a decent standard of living for
unemployed workers (column iii). Then the odds of a Norwegian favouring
governmental intervention in the market to ensure that everyone has a job
are 17 times greater compared to the average American (column iv).
It is evident that social policy enjoys high levels of support in some of the
more encompassing welfare states, particularly in Norway where policies have
been designed to promote solidarity. Less evident perhaps, is why support for
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some aspects of social policy should be stronger in a country such as the UK, a
‘liberal’ welfare regime with policy designs that are more commodifying and
stratifying than a ‘social democratic’ welfare regime such as Sweden (table 1).
We have already noted the debate over the institutional logic of welfare
attitudes. In the RoG survey data, support for governmental action is not
always strongest in countries representing the social democratic regime and
weakest in countries representing the liberal regime. The ﬁndings suggest that
British citizens have strong social policy preferences and favour collective
solutions to risk, a ﬁnding particularly evident in the ﬁelds of pensions, health
and job-creation policies (table 1 ). For example, the odds of a British citizen
claiming that the state should provide decent living standards in retirement
are more than ﬁve times greater than for the average American; for a Swedish
citizen the equivalent odds are just three times greater compared to the US
reference group (column i). Differences over health care rights are even more
pronounced. The odds of a British citizen claiming that the state should
guarantee the right to health care are 16 times greater than for the average
American; for a Swedish citizen the equivalent odds are only twice those of
the US reference category (columns ii). Lastly, the odds of a British citizen
favouring governmental action in the labour market to ensure that everyone
has a job are ﬁve times greater compared with the average American. By
contrast, Swedish citizens have only twice the odds of supporting government
action in this policy arena compared to the US reference group (column iv).
Enduring public support for welfare state institutions, it seems, can no longer
be assumed in those countries with strong social democratic traditions
(Davidsson and Marx 2013).
The Impact of Occupation Category
So far, we have looked at the social class effects generally, rather than their
variations within and between nations. The results from the regression
analysis can be used to estimate the relative odds of men and women in each
class in each country favouring welfare rights. Table 2, for example, considers
class preferences for social security policy that guards against unemployment
risks for those aged 25–44. Here we see the odds of a low-skilled Norwegian
female claiming that the state should protect the living standards of
unemployed workers are now 21 times greater compared to the US reference
category. The equivalent odds for a man are reduced but the magnitude of
difference is still 15 times greater using the same reference group. The odds
of a low-skilled female worker in Germany or France believing that
government action is required to protect the living standards of unemployed
workers are ﬁve times greater compared to the US reference group (table 2).
The equivalent odds for a man are 4-1 . Support for social policy that guards
against unemployment risks is relatively low across the English-speaking
nations overall and this ﬁnding is reﬂected in the class-based analysis (shown
in table 2). Low-skilled female workers in Australia show the most solidarity
with unemployed workers; the odds of respondents there claiming that
unemployed workers should have the right to a decent standard of living
are three times greater compared to the American reference category.
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The ﬁnal part of the analysis focuses on fractured solidarities. Out of the
three welfare regime types, we ﬁnd that class gradients and divisions are more
evident in the ‘liberal’ group after controlling for other factors in the model
(table 3). However, it is also the case that divisions and gradients have
diminished here, particularly over the right to health care (column ii), but also
for unemployment rights (column iii). These ﬁndings may surprise, because
the ‘decommodiﬁcation’ of labour power is said to enhance the agency of
workers and undermines their capacity to be exploited. In other words, class
cleavages and divisions appear to have reduced over the survey period in
the English-speaking democracies when we might well have expected them
to increase at a time of growing insecurity. All governments and politicians
from across the political spectrum have pursued more punitive ALMPs that
have had the greater impact on low-skilled and more precarious workers
(issues to do with class fragmentation and precarization effects are beyond
the scope of this article, see della Porta et al. 2015 ).
Class-welfare divisions are less evident overall in either the Nordic or
Bismarckian nations (table 3 ) compared to the English-speaking nations, but
there is some evidence of convergence as once-ﬁrm welfare alliances appear
to fracture. In the corporatist group, working-class representatives in 2006
display much stronger preferences for health care rights than in1996 (column
ii). It is suggested that Germany’s two-tiered health care system is leading to a
much higher quality of care for the wealthy and is becoming more divisive,
which is perhaps reﬂected in the opinion data (Busse and Blümel 2014). In
France, as well, the increase in supplementary health insurance is creating a
tiered health care system that appears more divided on class lines, despite full
coverage policies (Chevreul et al. 2010).
In the Nordic group of nations, working-class interests in the means of
security are becoming more visible, particularly in the right to work (column
iv). As the postwar collectivist order was renegotiated during the 1990s with
ALMPs, it appears to have exposed new divisions and fractures in cross-class
welfare coalitions (Kananen 2014). In the early years of the 21st century,
manual workers in the Nordic group, who face greater job insecurity than their
middle-class counterparts, were signiﬁcantly more likely to claim they should
have a right to work than they were in in the1990s. Remarkably, the growing
demand for citizenship rights has occurred against the general background of
lower unemployment risks (unemployment rates were higher in both Norway
and Sweden in 1996 compared to 2006 ). A similar pattern is also present in
the corporatist group of nations. Low-skilled workers in France and Germany
increased their demands for citizenship rights after the implementation of
high-proﬁle labour-market reforms (i.e. between the 1996 and 2006 RoG
surveys, e.g. Hartz reforms 2003–05, Hinrichs 2010). These reforms also
coincided with greater risk however (unemployment rates in both France and
Germany were above the EU and OECD average during the 2000s).
Discussion and Conclusions
Within market society, the priority is given to free choices within that market,
and many believe that society will function best when market principles are
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extended to all areas of life. Such arguments might be applied to insurance
against illness, unemployment, old-age and other risks that prevent citizens
from earning a living. These have typically become areas of egalitarian
welfare policy, security and citizenship rights enshrined in social policy. This
is an increasingly contested political arena, however, that demands careful
scrutiny as workers are buffeted and unsettled by new levels of risk and
insecurity.
The article has examined changing attitudes towards welfare rights in
different market societies over two decades. Leaving aside for the moment
questions about the reliability of the cross-national survey data underpinning
the analyses, we ﬁnd that the traditional welfare functions of the state that
ensure decent living standards in old-age and health care have not lost
relevance during major periods of welfare reform. Attitudes towards social
security and the idea that government should guarantee everyone a job appear
to be changing, however, as further ALMP reforms bite. Here the survey data
appear to indicate a shifting trend away from support and solidarity for once-
key policy components of the welfare state. The patterns of change in social
attitudes may be explained, at least in part, by declines in traditional class-
based political parties and the changing point of political gravity towards the
right. Increasingly, leftist parties appear electorally and ideologically depleted
with the rise of populist parties in Europe and most recently the election of
Donald Trump in the USA promising to stop job competition through
migrants and refugees. Support for right-wing populism seems bound to rise
as electorates continue to hold national politicians accountable for their
growing sense of insecurity and socio-economic misfortune.
The ﬁndings suggest welfare regimes matter, to a degree. In general,
support for less stratifying forms of social policy emerges most strongly in the
Nordic world. Support for selective social policy and commodiﬁcation is
growing in the liberal world. The Bismarckian world is somewhere in between.
From the analysis reported here, it certainly appears that solidarity with
unemployed workers has declined in most contexts (except in the USA, where
attitudes have been consistent across all four RoGwaves). However, declines in
welfare solidarity in the coordinated market economies of Continental Europe
have been relatively modest in comparison to the market liberal states. The
survey evidence suggests that, if most people were not opposed to the direction
of recent labour-market reforms, they were certainly not in favour of them
either. It is argued that the turn towards the neo-liberal ‘work-ﬁrst’ or American
model of activation marks a retreat from the security of the transfer-heavy
welfare state in the Nordic (Kananen 2014) and Bismarckian nations (Hinrichs
2010). ALMPs are now being strengthened as Lødemel and Moreira observe,
therefore it will be fascinating to see whether there are any ‘thermostatic effects’
(Wlezien1995) in future rounds of the RoG in the (once) encompassing welfare
states of Northern and Continental Europe. In Britain, there is little evidence of
a shift in public opinion to support such thermostatic expectations for social
security at present (Deeming and Johnson 2017, forthcoming).5
The class analysis is interesting, suggesting cracks have appeared in the
social bases of solidarity in the Nordic and Bismarckian countries, following
major social reforms – particularly evident in relation to citizenship rights to
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work and health care. Solidarity appears more fragile and fractured. Old social
risks such as unemployment are still real, as Crouch and Keune (2012 ) note,
and social policy is not responsive to the protective and investment-orientated
risk-taking functions required in the modern economy (Deeming and Smyth
2017). Class gradients and oppositions are more pronounced in the liberal
market economies than in the Nordic countries, but appear to have softened
(here real class differences and inequalities are substantially larger than
elsewhere). Interestingly, class oppositions appear not to have increased in
the liberal group at a time when we might this, following the intensiﬁcation
of ‘work-ﬁrst’ ALMP reforms (table 3 ). This ﬁnding could suggest that the
public are adapting to the new environment, becoming more self-reliant and
accepting of risk (Keune and Serrano 2014). Will these trends continue?
With the growing trend towards the recommodiﬁcation of labour and more
punitive ‘work-ﬁrst’ policies based on compulsion and sanctions and the
control of unwanted behaviour, we must ask, will class antagonisms appear
more (or less) pronounced in the next survey wave as a result? ALMPs are
now being strengthened in many welfare states; in fact, Lødemel and
Gubrium (2014) suggest that we are currently witnessing a new ‘third wave’
of ALMP reforms that started with the global ﬁnancial crises of 2008 . If
policy (feedback) causes opinion, we might expect further declines in support
for social security protection as a right as more self-reliant middle class citizens
in market societies look to minimize their own personal risk exposures at the
expense of others or become more supportive of the emerging social
investment reform agendas which they and their children are more likely to
beneﬁt from (Häusermann and Palier 2017). There appears to be a growing
political consensus around the merits of ALMPs and work intensiﬁcation and
growing public acceptance of these programmes, as ideas about the legitimacy
of proactive social policy becomes more ﬁrmly embedded across nations.
Limitations and agenda for further research
In this study, we have examined the nature and distribution of welfare state
attitudes using ISSP RoG data, with particular attention to the class-attitudes
nexus. A number of cautions and suggestions for further research follow.
First, we might wish to test (or know the extent to which) this particular
survey module is capturing or reﬂecting real and deep-seated value changes
in Western societies and where issues of class and ALMP can be addressed
directly. Qualitative comparative inquiry is likely to help in this respect.
Qualitative research might also consider the ways in which both working-class
and middle-class citizens conceptualize risk and policy preferences. Second,
the RoG module focuses on the right to work, i.e. the ‘direct’ job-creation
aspect of labour market policy. However, while spending on direct job-
creation still accounts for the largest component of ALMP spending in the
OECD, it is in decline, and spending on ‘employment incentives’ for
employers is increasing. Future work might probe public attitudes to ALMPs
more closely, including examining views on the use of employer incentives
and public investment in training programmes (human capital and
employability), as well as attitudes towards ALMPs. Conceptually, it is not
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entirely clear where the ‘right’ to work or a ‘job guarantee’ by the state ends
and a ‘workfare’ type of programme begins.
In the analysis, it is assumed (quite reasonably, given the selection) that no
country has undergone a fundamental change of regime during the study
period. Further work might wish to consider attitudes to risk in changing
welfare regimes (Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland are perhaps cases
in point, Obinger et al. 2010). National panel surveys might be able to shed
more light on those individuals who have changed or modiﬁed their own
views about risk and citizenship rights in light of recent reforms. Repeated
cross-sectional survey data from surveys such as the ISSP RoG allow attitudes
to be estimated only at the aggregate level (i.e. the attitude of each individual
is measured at only one point in time, whereas in the panel survey the unit of
analysis is an individual person).
Appendix
The ISSP is a continuing programme of cross-national collaboration providing
cross-national and cross-cultural perspectives on key research topics in the
social sciences. A repeated cross-sectional survey design is used along with
sampling procedures in an attempt to ensure that views are nationally
representative of all individuals aged over 15 who reside within private
households in the participating countries. Table A1 shows the RoG study
sample. Each national research organization funds all of its own survey costs.
There are no central funds. The merging of the data into a cross-national
data set is performed by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung,
University of Cologne, in collaboration with the Analisis Sociologicos,
Economicos y Politicos in Spain.
Table A1
Role of Government country-wave study sample
Wave I
(1985)
Wave II
(1990 )
Wave III
(1996 )
Wave IV
(2006) Totals
Australia (AUS) 1,528 2 ,398 2,151 2 ,781 8 ,858
France (FRA) - - 1 ,312 1,824 3,136
Germany (DEU)
α
1,048 3,840 3,470 1 ,643 10,001
New Zealand (NZL) - - 1,198 1,263 2 ,461
Norway (NOR) - 1,517 1 ,344 1,330 4,191
Sweden (SWE) - - 1,238 1,194 2 ,432
United Kingdom (GBR) 1 ,530 1,197 989 930 4,646
United States (USA) 677 1 ,217 1,332 1,518 4 ,744
Totals 4 ,783 10,169 13,034 12,483 40,469
Source: ISSP RoG I–IV (ISSP Research Group 2008).
Note: α = Wave I of the RoG covered only West Germany; all of Germany from Wave II.
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Notes
1. ‘Workfare’, ‘activation’ and ‘ALMPs’ are terms invariably used to capture the so-
called ‘activation strategies’ found in the advanced economies. Many distinguish
between a Nordic-style ‘train-ﬁrst’ approach focused on employability and an
Anglo-American ‘work-ﬁrst’ approach that emphasizes rapid job re-entry,
although the level of neo-liberal ‘work-ﬁrst’ convergence is a topic of much
scholarly debate. ALMPs with vocational training were developed as early as
the 1950s in Sweden, while liberal activation and ‘workfare’ (meaning work for
your beneﬁts) was at the forefront of US welfare reforms in the 1970s and
1980s. These particulars are well canvassed in the literature, see Bonoli (2013 :
22–3 ) for example.
2. EGP classes were created using the SPSS-program developed by Ganzeboom et al.
(1992 ), based on the ISCO-88 occupational codes available in the latest survey
waves. The classed regression analysis presented here is restricted to RoG survey
data from waves III and IV; fundamental changes to the way occupation is coded
in the ISSP survey occurred after the second wave. In the ﬁrst and second round,
occupational coding is country-speciﬁc, as national statistical agencies employed
their own class schemes. Unfortunately, country-speciﬁc data precludes reliable
comparative trend analysis using class as the independent variable across all four
waves for this sample of nations. Another approach to deﬁning ‘class’ membership
(rather than occupation position) might be to consider the respondent’s own
perception of their position in the social hierarchy. Lack of consistency across
the survey waves remains an issue however. While a question on ‘subjective social
class’ appeared in wave III of the RoG, this was replaced in wave IV by a ‘Top -
Bottom self-placement (10 point scale)’.
3. Barack Obama, Second Presidential Debate in Nashville, Tennessee. 7 October
2008.
4. In 2011, for example, public expenditure on ALMPs in Denmark was 2.3 per
cent of gross domestic product (GDP), around one percentage point in the
Bismarckian nations and just 0.3 per cent in Australia and New Zealand. The
USA had the lowest spend: 0.1 per cent of GDP.
5. According to the theory, support for governmental spending on social
programmes is linked to public perceptions about whether spending is increasing
or is in decline. As public spending declines support for public spending goes up
and vice-versa.
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